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STILL OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: RECONCILING CITIZENS
UNITED WITH ABOOD AND BECK
JEREMY G. MALLORY*

"But even more profitable is the privilege of taking the golden eggs
laid by someone else's goose."
-Louis

D. Brandeis, Other People'sMoney'

At the beginning of the twentieth century, future Supreme Court
Justice Louis Brandeis captured the imaginations of the readers of
Harper's Weekly with a muckraking expos6 entitled Other People's
Money and How the Bankers Use It.2 The series of stories revealed the
extraordinary power corporate managers of the time had to direct the
vast resources concentrated in the corporate form for anti-competitive
purposes. As a result of these articles, corporations' participation in
politics came under increasingly close scrutiny. Congress passed the
* Associate, Kirkland & Ellis LLP. The views expressed in this Article are
exclusively those of the Author and do not necessarily reflect those of Kirkland &
Ellis LLP. This Article has been prepared for informational purposes only and does
not constitute legal advice. This information is not intended to create, and receipt of
it does not constitute, a lawyer-client relationship. Readers should not act upon this
without seeking advice from professional advisers.
The Author would like to thank Jim Whitehead, Michael Nemeroff, Nirav Shah,
Nancy Jacobson, and Richard Epstein for their comments, advice, and analysis.
Special thanks to Judge Diane P. Wood for her invaluable mentorship and guidance.
Last and never least, he would like to acknowledge deep gratitude to his partner,
Ray Hulse.
1. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MoNEY AND How THE BANKERS USE

IT 17-18 (Frederick A. Stokes Co. ed., 1914).
2. Norman Hapgood, Preface to BRANDEIS, supra note 1, at v-vi.
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Tillman Act only three years later, which prohibited the direct
contribution of corporate and union funds to political candidates.
Brandeis railed against the use of "other people's money" for political
purposes and the anger resonated widely. The desire to protect
shareholder money from perceived misuse by corporate managers was
later articulated by the Supreme Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce4 and Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts
Citizensfor Life (MCFL).5 The Court recognized that the expressive
and political interests of corporate owners (shareholders) and
corporate managers might diverge; the corporation was not a
monolithic speaker, but rather a complex of contract and trust.6
The concern articulated by Brandeis and extended in these cases
sustaining campaign spending restrictions expresses a coherent view
of expressive rights that has extended to other areas of law, such as the
use of union dues, but it has come under attack in recent decades. This
concern stands in stark contrast to the central claims of the entitybased theories of free speech undergirding other seminal cases in the
Court's campaign finance jurisprudence, including First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti7 and Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission.8 Bellotti provided the foundational principle that
animated
the
majority's
opinion
in
Citizens
United:
"Bellotti reaffirmed the First Amendment principle that the
Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker's
corporate identity." 9 While Bellotti and Citizens United focused

3. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
4. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
5. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). See Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 133, 135-37 (1998) (describing the trajectory of the desire to protect
shareholder money through Austin and MCFL).
6. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263-64 (noting that the lack of shareholders in a
nonprofit organization could place it outside of a state restriction on independent
spending); id. at 268-69 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(parsing the significance of the presence of shareholders as a difference in degree,
not kind); Austin, 494 U.S. at 663 (noting that an organization's members may feel
coerced even if they are not de jure shareholders); id. at 673-75 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (describing the Michigan state law as protecting shareholders).
7. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
8. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
9. Id. at 902 (citation omitted).
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primarily on the role of the corporation as speaker and the risks of
quid pro quo corruption (and accordingly struck down restrictions on
campaign financing), Austin and MCFL were more deeply concerned
by the very subject that motivated Brandeis: the use of "other people's
money" for speech they did not support. A set of cases involving
unions, bar associations, and universities raised the concern about the
use of "other people's money" to a constitutional level, exemplified
by Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,'0 Communications Workers
of America v. Beck," and Keller v. State Bar of California.12 In
essence, these cases place limits on the degree to which a union (or
bar association) may spend membership fees on political speech.
Indeed, twelve years before Citizens United, commentator Adam
Winkler argued that Austin, MCFL, and the union-dues cases13
weakened Bellotti to the point that it might no longer be good law for
some propositions. 14
Austin is no more, however, at least in this regard. Citizens United
decisively and explicitly overruled it, restoring Bellotti to clear
primacy.' 5 On its face, this step would seem to eradicate any basis for
an "other people's money" theory of corruption in contrast to the quid
pro quo corruption that arises in connection with the singular-entity
vision of the corporation. Nevertheless, the union-dues cases were
never addressed by Citizens United, nor was the Tillman Act. On one
hand, if Citizens United overruled these cases sub silentio, the results
are far-reaching and dramatic.' 6 On the other hand, if-and the Court
would likely insist so-such a drastic result would not happen sub
silentio, then the ongoing vitality of the union-dues cases and the
Tillman Act pose a threat to Citizens United unless the two sets of
cases are harmonized. The solution that best addresses the strong
claims of each set of cases would be a form of rebate or opt-out such
10. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
11. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
12. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
13. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to Abood, Beck, and Keller
collectively as the "union-dues cases."
14. Winkler, supra note 5, at 135-37.
15. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
16. Id. at 977-78 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(addressing how thoroughly the majority forsook the anti-corruption justification
focused on the use of other people's money).
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as what resulted from Beck, which permitted a union member to
receive a rebate of any membership fees that would be used for
political speech with which the union member disagreed.' 7 Part I of
this Article considers the different theories of corruption found in the
competing lines of cases and the corresponding assumption about the
nature of the corporate entity: Bellotti's focus on quid pro quo
corruption assumes a unitary corporation, and Austin's worry about
other-people's-money corruption takes into account the divided nature
of authority in the corporate form. Part II expands on the discussion of
other-people's-money corruption in Austin with an exploration of the
union-dues cases and why they carry persuasive force in the corporate
arena as well. Part III addresses the Court's current crossroads: the
line of cases beginning with Bellotti and culminating in Citizens
United is starkly incompatible with the Austin line of cases. While
Citizens United overruled Austin, it left the union-dues cases and the
Tillman Act standing unquestioned. Now the Court must reckon with
this unfinished business.' 8 Part IV suggests a possible method of
handling the conflict without abandoning either Citizens United or the
union-dues cases.
I. Two VISIONS OF CORRUPTION AND THE CORPORATION

In 1999, then-Adjunct Professor Adam Winkler outlined the steps
taken by the Court following its seminal decision in First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.19 In his article, Beyond Bellotti, he argued
the "three pillars" undergirding the decision in Bellotti had been
undermined by the Court's later decisions in MCFL and Austin.20 In
Bellotti, the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that forbade

17. See infra Part IV.
18. This awkward situation vindicates Winkler's analysis, albeit obliquely. He
argued that Austin and MCFL weakened Bellotti. Winkler, supra note 5, at 133.
However, the Court in Citizens United reiterated Bellotti's vitality. Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. at 913 ("We return to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that
the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's
corporate identity."). Nevertheless, if my thesis is correct, then the principles behind
Austin still require some modification of the successful BellottilCitizens United
regime.
19. Winkler, supra note 5, at 135-36.
20. Id.
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corporations from spending money on ballot initiatives. 2 1 Justice
Powell's majority opinion found the state had an interest in preventing
quid pro quo corruption, but had little or no interest in preventing the
"drown[ing] out" of speech by wealthier participants in the
discourse.2 2 The Court rejected the applicability of concern for quid
pro quo corruption in an election with no candidates, such as the
initiative vote before it. 23 The Court also found, "The inherent worth
of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not
depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union, or individual."2 4 These findings would later
become pivotal for Citizens United.2 5
Of the three pillars supporting Bellotti that Winkler discerned, the
two most salient to this Article's inquiry are the conceptual and
theoretical discussions. "Conceptually," Winkler argued, "the Justices
based their judgment of the corporate initiative speech ban [at stake in
Bellotti] on a particular understanding of 'corruption'-one that
encompassed only financial quid pro quo deals between candidates
and contributors. ... "26 Because no candidates would be involved in
an issue-based initiative election, the Bellotti Court reasoned, no
danger of quid pro quo corruption could arise. 27 The other salient
pillar supporting the Bellotti decision was "the Court's theoretical
approach to the constitutional principle of freedom of speech, which
focused on the informational needs of recipients of corporate speech
and extended corporate speech rights accordingly." 28 The Court
reasoned the speech offered by corporations was valuable to the

21. First Nat'1 Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978).
22. Id. at 789-90.
23. Id. at 790.
24. Id. at 777.
25. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898-911
(2010). The Court rejected the contention that the nature of the speaker matters, id.
at 898-903, and accepted Bellotti's explanation of the state's interest in regulating
corruption, id. at 903-11. The discussion of the "corporate identity" of the speaker
derived from Bellotti was referenced seven times by the opinions making up the
majority voting bloc. Id. at 886, 902, 903, 913.
26. Winkler, supra note 5, at 135.
27. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789-92.
28. Winkler, supra note 5, at 135.
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listener regardless of the source and was therefore protected speech.2 9
Winkler and other commentators have characterized this approach as
focused on the hearer's rights rather than the speaker's rights. 30 in
making this move, the Court treated the corporation as a singular
source of speech, like any other speaker.
In contrast, Austin and MCFL drew both of these core theories
into question. Austin articulated a concern with a form of corruption
more subtle than the outright quid pro quo transaction envisioned in
Bellotti.3 1 The transaction motivating Austin was instead the use of
"other people's money" to finance political speech with which they
might disagree. 3 2 No opinion forsakes either of these two theories of

29. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777, 782-84.
30. Winkler, supra note 5, at 195-96.
31. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)
(addressing "a different type of corruption" from that faced in Bellotti, specifically
the possibly distorting effects of the aggregation of wealth accumulated with the
help of corporate form but having little to do with the corporation's political ideas).
32. Winkler, supra note 5, at 155-56. Notably, while Austin is most often cited
for the principle of equalizing voices in the political arena, this view seems to be
prompted more by the dissent's characterization of the Court's opinion, rather than
the majority opinion itself. Many commentators read Austin to prescribe an
equalization of voices. Id. Justice Scalia's dissent described the holding as "one
man, one minute." Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Twenty years
later, this was the same characterization employed by Citizens United on the way to
overturning the case. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 922
(2010). These characterizations, however, swing somewhat wide of the Court's
actual opinion. The majority opinion very clearly states that the Michigan law
upheld in Austin "does not attempt to equalize the relative influence of speakers on
elections." Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted).
See also Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro
Broadcasting, 1990 SUP. CT. REv. 105, 108-11 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660)
(arguing Austin was more concerned about the connection between money and
voice-"that expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas
espoused by corporations"). The Austin Court was worried the equation of money
and speech in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), might become distorted. Austin,
494 U.S. at 659-60. Winkler further argues that drawing an equality principle from
Austin makes little sense because upholding the Michigan law would do nothing to
equalize inputs into the electoral process. Winkler, supra note 5, at 156. Thus, I
follow Winkler in rejecting the characterization of Austin as merely pursuing
equality of electoral voice and instead refer to it for the idea that "other people's
money" should not be used for electoral speech unless there is some way to connect
the money with actual political support for the speech.
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corruption, but no opinion really reckons with the differences between
the two either. A concern for quid pro quo corruption is forwardlooking: the initial transaction (the purchase of speech with money) is
only a problem if the risk of a future illicit transaction exists (the
candidate who is elected because of the speech confers benefits in
return). The concern with the use of "other people's money," by
contrast, is backward-looking: the key transaction happened in the
past.33 These two visions of corruption are not mutually exclusive or
even necessarily incompatible, but they pull in different directions.
The "other people's money" conception of corruption relies on a
theory of the corporate speaker at odds with the theory at work in
Bellotti. Rather than Bellotti's unitary speaker, the corporation seen in
Austin and MCFL is divided between the shareholders who finance the
speech and the managers who actually speak. 34 The very fact that the
corporation is not unitary produces the friction that potentially
infringes on free speech.3 1 In essence, when managers 36 spend money
on corporate electoral speech, they are expending funds entrusted to
them by the owners of the corporation, the shareholders. They are
spending "other people's money" in a literal sense. Winkler posits that
this expenditure constitutes a form of corruption because it breaks the

33. Indeed, Winkler refers to this use of "other people's money" as
conversion. See Winkler, supra note 5, at 164, 193, 216, 218. His use of the term
initially seems plausible, but it may focus the discussion excessively on whether the
action in question actually constitutes the common-law tort. The presence or absence
of corruption is not dependent on there being an actual conversion, so this Article
will avoid the use of the term.
34. Adam Winkler, "Other People's Money": Corporations,Agency Costs,
and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 906-12 (2004) (describing the
increasing separation of ownership and control of corporations through the early
20th century); id. at 927-37 (describing the explanatory force of agency costs as a
way of understanding the progression of campaign finance law from the Tillman Act
through the union-dues cases).
35. Winkler framed this friction in terms of agency costs. Id. at 873. The
problems posed for electoral speech by the separation between ownership and
control in the corporate form-and especially the applicability of the law of trusts
and fiduciary duty-will be taken up in Part IV.
36. The term "managers" is being used in a generic sense here to connote the
people who run a corporation's affairs on a day-to-day basis. "Management" will
also be used infra in the customary manner to describe a union's counter-party in
labor negotiations.
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expressive chain between money and speech.3 7 The Court in Buckley
v. Valeo described this linkage between money and speech in depth. 38
Buckley's basic equation was later reiterated in Abood:
"[C]ontributing to an organization for the purpose of spreading a
political message is protected by the First Amendment." 39 Ordinarily,
individuals use their own resources to express support for a candidate
by spending money to buy speech to that end. The resulting speech is
calibrated to the intensity of support; the more a person supports a
candidate, the more he or she will sacrifice in order to generate more
speech. On this view, the speech would have a sort of special value
because it directly expresses the convictions of the person who
generates the resources to purchase it. 40
Winkler's critique is based on a break in that chain. Austin
worried that "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form" might "have little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas."4 1 When a corporation
buys political speech, the people expressing their views are not the
ones generating the wealth, but rather the ones stewarding it. They
express their views, but not with their own money. 4 2 In this respect,
the Buckley equation is skewed: speech no longer correlates to
37. Winkler, supra note 5, at 202-10 (analyzing the rights at stake in terms of
the expressive and associational rights of the shareholders).
38. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15-21 (1976).
39. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977).
40. The Lockean underpinnings of this perspective are obvious. I own myself;
I own my labor; I own the fruits of my labor; I own the things the fruits of my labor
produce or allow me to buy. When I purchase speech, that speech is therefore
expressive of myself in a manner that matters.
41. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
42. A forceful critique of Winkler's position would assert that corporate
managers are not actually advancing their own expressive agenda but rather their
interpretations of the corporation's agenda. This argument takes seriously the role of
the corporate manager, but elides the other party at issue in this question: the
shareholders. The owners of a corporation arguably have a stronger claim to its
voice than its managers do and should be the ones interpreting its agenda. As
Brandeis memorably stated, "Serve one Master only." BRANDEIS, supra note 1, at
69. The next logical response is that the managers are still acting as "good stewards"
by exercising their business judgment. This argument will be taken up in Part III,
dealing with fiduciary duties.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol47/iss1/2

8

Mallory: Still Other People's Money: Reconciling Citizens United with Aboo

2010]

STILL OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY

9

political support.4 3 Making use of other people's money in this
manner is, to Winkler, a form of corruption thrown into relief in
Austin and MCFL.
Austin and MCFL drew into question two of the pillars
undergirding Bellotti, positing a second form of corruption wrapped
around a second conception of the corporation as a speaker. This
contrast was not only found in Austin; a line of cases concerning the
use of union dues and a still-vital federal statute instantiate this "other
people's money" view of political corruption.44 As long as these cases
and the theories they embody retain vitality, Bellotti-and thus
Citizens United-still rest on a contested foundation.
II. THE UNION-SPEECH CASES: HANSON, STREET, ABOOD, BECK
A conception of corruption resulting from the use of "other
people's money" arises not only from Austin and MCFL, but also from
a series of cases that facially seem to be of limited application to the
campaign finance context because they chiefly involve union dues.
These cases, however, delineate a constitutional principle that has not
been limited merely to the union context. Given the fate of Austin in
Citizens United,45 these cases must be central to any reformation of
Winkler's core thesis of other-people's-money corruption. The
continued vitality of this line of cases in the face of Citizens United,
along with the still unquestioned Tillman Act, preserves the core
conception of corruption through the use of "other people's money."
In Communications Workers of America v. Beck, the Supreme
Court found that section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act
of 1935 (NLRA) 46 allows a union to collect and spend only the funds
required to "'perform[] the duties of an exclusive representative of the
employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management
43. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660; Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for
Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 260-62 (1986).
44. See Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907); Keller v. State Bar of Cal.,
496 U.S. 1 (1990); Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988);
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
45. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010)
(overruling Austin).
46. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 452
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006)).
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issues."' 47 Eleven years earlier, however, the associative and
expressive nature of the union had been given a constitutional gloss in
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.4 8 Taken together, the two
decisions connect political expenditures and First Amendment
expression in a manner that presages the Citizens United decision
decades later and recapitulates the theory of corruption articulated in
Austin and MCFL.
A. Beck's Predecessors:Hanson, Street, and Abood
Although "Beck rights" have become more familiar, the
constitutional force behind them arises from the Supreme Court's
earlier decision in Abood. In Abood, the Court took up a constitutional
question raised and avoided in earlier cases. 49 These earlier cases
taken together set up the constitutional issue in Abood, which in turn
gives Beck special import in the campaign finance context.
The chief background for the cases is the "union shop." In 1951,
Congress amended the Railway Labor Act (RLA) to permit the
formation of union shops.50 The provisions permitted by the
amendment allow for a union to negotiate a security clause that
requires all employees to be union members, or to become members
within a specified period after employment.5 1 The union shop is a
variant of the closed shop,5 2 in which only union members may be
hired at all.
The plaintiffs in Railway Employees Department v. Hanson were
employees at a union shop who simply did not desire to join the
union. 53 They asserted that they were protected by the Nebraska
Constitution, which had a "right to work" provision.5 4 The defendants
47. Beck, 487 U.S. at 762-63 (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S.
Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984)).

48. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
49. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Ry. Emps. Dep't
v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
50. Beck, 487 U.S. at 746.
51. See John V. Spielmans, BargainingFee versus Union Shop, 10 INDus. &
LAB. REL. REv. 609, 609 (1956).
52. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 231 n.3.
53. Id. at 227.
54. Id. at 228; see NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 13.
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urged that the Nebraska laws should be found preempted by the
federal Railway Labor Act.55 The Nebraska Supreme Court held that
the union shop agreement violated the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution, leaving no valid federal law to impede the force of
the Nebraska Constitution. 5 6 The Supreme Court did not hesitate at the
permissive nature of the RLA-union shops were certainly not
compelled by the law-noting that the federal statute was sufficient to
ground any challenge to a union shop contract.5 7 "If private rights are
being invaded, it is by force of an agreement made pursuant to federal
law which expressly declares that state law is superseded. In other
words, the federal statute is the source of power and authority by
which any private rights are lost or sacrificed."58 The statutory
operation was a sufficient hook for the Court's jurisdiction, "though it
takes a private agreement to invoke the federal sanction." 59 Thus the
Court dispensed with the threshold issues and reached the substantive
core of the case.
With the jurisdictional and state-action issues behind it, the Court
proceeded to the merits. On the merits, the Court found, "The choice
by the Congress of the union shop as a stabilizing force seems to us to
be an allowable one." 60 The Court broadly allowed Congress and
unions to allocate union dues to different types of expenditure without
interference from the courts. 6 1 The Court noted in passing, however,
that "a different problem would be presented" if dues were used "for
purposes not germane to collective bargaining."62
The Hanson Court straightforwardly declined to address the First
Amendment questions presented, specifically the problems posed by
"forc[ing] men into ideological and political associations." 63 On the
record presented, "there is no more an infringement or impairment of

55. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 228-29.
56. Id. at 230.
57. Id. at 231-32.
58. Id. at 232 (citation omitted); see also id. at 232 n.4 ("Once courts enforce
the agreement the sanction of government is, of course, put behind them.").

59. Id. at 232.
60. Id. at 233.

61. Id. at 234.
62. Id. at 235.
63. Id. at 236.
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First Amendment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer
who by state law is required to be a member of an integrated bar."64
Perhaps aware of the far-reaching consequences of a broad ruling in
this area, the Court limited Hanson to approving the exercise of
Commerce Clause power by Congress permitting union shop
arrangements. 65 In other words, Hanson noted the federal question and
constitutional issue that inhered in union shop provisions, but found
no constitutional violation.
A similar set of questions arose in InternationalAssociation of
Machinists v. Street.66 Employees of the Southern Railway System
were compelled to join a set of labor organizations. 67 They filed suit in
Georgia state court because some portion of the dues were spent to
finance political campaigns for candidates they opposed.6 8 The
Supreme Court of Georgia enjoined the enforcement of the union shop
agreement on the ground that it violated the First Amendment. 6 9 Once
more, a state court found a violation of the federal Constitution.
The Street Court took a different approach to the constitutional
issues involved. It noted that the record in Hanson could not support
adjudication of the constitutional issues, but that the record presented
in Street was "adequate squarely to present the constitutional
questions reserved in Hanson."70 Nevertheless, despite the clean
presentation of the constitutional issue, the Court decided the case by
interpreting section 2, Eleventh of the RLA in order to avoid the

64. Id. at 238. In 1990, thirty-four years after Hanson, a parallel question was
presented to the Court in Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990). The
Court not only found that a First Amendment question was presented, id. at 7, but
also that the First Amendment prohibited the use of fees for ideological and political
goals, id. at 13-17 (applying Abood and arguing that the state bar was no different
from a union in this respect). The move from the dictum in Hanson to the result in
Keller is indicative of the shifts in the Court regarding both First Amendment
concepts and civil rights. See Part II.C for further discussion of the ramifications of
the distinction in Hanson and the dissolution of that distinction in Keller.
65. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238.
66. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
67. Id. at 742-44.
68. Id. at 744.
69. Id. at 744-45.
70. Id. at749.
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constitutional question. 7 ' The Court simply held that "[section] 2,
Eleventh is to be interpreted to deny the unions the power claimed in
this case," 72 resolving the case solely on the basis of the statute and
avoiding the constitutional problem. The narrow nature of the Court's
holding was emphasized by its remedial discussion. The Court refused
to strike down union shop agreements as a whole, but did insist that
the lower court find a way to remedy the use of union dues
specifically for political advocacy. 3 The Court specifically discussed
a refund of the proportion of union dues that were spent on political
advocacy for employees who reported their disagreement to the
*74
union.
Even though a majority of the Court agreed with the disposition,
the remedy and constitutional discussion provoked some
disagreement. Justice Whittaker concurred with the result but
dissented from the proposed remedy, and Justice Douglas concurred
with the remedy dubitante. Justice Black found section 2, Eleventh
to violate the First Amendment. 76 Justice Frankfurter, joined by
Justice Harlan, rejected the restrictive interpretation of the statute used
by the majority to avoid the constitutional question 77 and applied
Hanson to find the union's use of the fees to be constitutional. 7 8
Justice Frankfurter believed the record in Hanson was sufficient to
rule on the constitutional question, and the record in both cases did not
amount to a violation of the First Amendment. 79 The provision did not
abridge any rights because the employee was still permitted to speak

71. See id. at 749-50; see also id. at 750-70 (analyzing the legislative history
and intention of Congress).
72. Id. at 770.
73. Id. at 771-74.
74. Id. at 774-75.
75. Id. at 779-80 (Whittaker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id.
at 775-79 (Douglas, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 791 (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. at 797 ("With so vital a
principle at stake, I cannot agree to imposition of parsimonious limitations on the
kind of decree the courts below can fashion in their efforts to afford effective
protection to these priceless constitutional rights.").
77. Id. at 799-800 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 803-19.
79. Id. at 804-06.
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in other venues.8 0 Further, the permissive nature of the union shop
provision mitigated concerns of constitutional violation.81 Overall,
eight Justices found the expenditure of union dues for political
advocacy to be problematic. Seven concurred in the majority opinion,
at least in part, holding that the statute forbade the practice, and
Justice Black would have found the practice unconstitutional. Seven
Justices concurred with Justice Brennan's proposed refund remedy, 82
one of them doubtfully. 83
Unlike Hanson and Street, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education84
did not duck or evade the constitutional issue. Abood presented a
factual situation that prevented further avoidance of the question. The
Detroit Federation of Teachers was certified as the exclusive
bargaining representative for public school teachers in Detroit.8 5
Several teachers objected to the compulsory assessment of fees
because they did not believe in the unionization of public
employees. 86 The teachers further alleged the union engaged in
political activities with which they disagreed. The complaint alleged
a constitutional violation, which the state courts addressed.
In
contrast to Street, no federal statute, such as the RLA, was implicated,
meaning the case could not be resolved by statutory interpretation. 89
Abood was decided straightforwardly on the First Amendment right
not to be compelled to associate with speech with which one
disagrees.
To compel employees financially to support their collective
bargaining representative has an impact on their First Amendment
80. Id. at 806.
81. Id. at 806-07.
82. Id. at 771-75 (majority opinion).
83. Id. at 779 (Douglas, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority's opinion
"on the understanding that all relief granted will be confined to the six protesting
employees").
84. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
85. Id. at 211-12.
86. Id. at 212-13.
87. Id. at 213.
88. Id. at 215.
89. Compare id. at 232-33, with Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
740, 768-70 (1961).
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interests.... To be required to help finance the union as a
collective-bargaining agent might well be thought, therefore, to
interfere in some way with an employee's freedom to associate for
the advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees
fit.90

Even though Hanson and Street arose in the context of private
employers and Abood involved public employees, the Court found,
"The differences between public- and private-sector collective
bargaining simply do not translate into differences in First
Amendment rights." 9 1Abood squarely dealt with the First Amendment
issue avoided in Hanson and skirted in Street.
Fundamental to Abood's First Amendment analysis was the
compulsory nature of the "contributions." The Court cited Buckley v.
Valeo 92 for the basic proposition that "contributing to an organization
for the purpose of spreading a political message is protected by the
First Amendment." 93 The Court reasoned, "The fact that the
[employees] are compelled to make, rather than prohibited from
making, contributions for political purposes works no less an
infringement of their constitutional rights." 94 Rather than limiting the
union's right to participate in political activity, the Court simply held
"the Constitution requires only that such expenditures be financed
from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees who do not
object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so
against their will by the threat of loss of governmental employment." 95
The employees could not avoid being associated with the political
speech short of quitting their job.
The concurring opinions shed some light on the nuances of
Abood's holding. Justice Rehnquist concurred specifically because he
disagreed with the plurality holding in Elrod v. Bums, which held
public employees could not be fired for expressing sympathies with
90. Abood, 431 U.S. at 222.
91. Id. at 232 (concluding that Hanson and Street applied to the question
before the Court).
92. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
93. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234.
94. Id. at 234-35.
95. Id. at 235-36. The limited nature of the remedy becomes significant when
considered in light of Bellotti and Citizens United. See infra Part IV.
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the party out of power.9 6 Although he did not directly say so, he would
likely have held the union shop provision unconstitutional on the same
grounds that Justice Powell would have held the patronage provision
Justice Stevens concurred
at stake in Elrod constitutional.
specifically to underscore the need for a trial to sort out the proper
remedy. 9 8 Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun, concurred in the judgment but rejected the equivalence
between the public and private sectors maintained by Justice Stewart's
lead opinion. 99 Unfettered by Hanson and Street in the public
employment context, Justice Powell would instead have found the
compulsory contribution to the public employees' union to violate the
Constitution.100 Moreover, he would have placed the burden of
justifying the expenditure on the state, rather than requiring the
employee to step forward and explicitly dissent and claim a pro rata
share of the rebate.o'0 Although the Court in Abood ruled on a broader
constitutional ground than Hanson and Street by finding the
distinction between public and private employment irrelevant, the
Court also articulated a potential narrowing principle by placing the
burden on the employee to step forward, rather than on the state to
justify the expenditure.1 02
B. Beck
Ostensibly, Beck was primarily a matter of statutory
interpretation, like Hanson and Street. In contrast to Hanson and
Street, which focused on the interpretation of the RLA, the Beck Court

96. Id. at 242-43 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citing Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S.
347 (1976)).
97. See id. at 243-44 ("I am unable to see a constitutional distinction between
a governmentally imposed requirement that a public employee be a Democrat or
Republican or else lose his job, and a similar requirement that a public employee
contribute to the collective-bargaining expenses of a labor union."). Justice
Rehnquist joined Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Elrod. Elrod, 427 U.S. at
381-88 (Powell, J., dissenting).
98. Abood, 431 U.S. at 244 (Stevens, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 250 (Powell, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 259.
101. Id. at 263-64.
102. Id. at 237-42 (majority opinion).
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focused on a parallel provision in the text of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).1 03 Thanks to Street and Abood, by the time the
case reached the Court, the constitutional issues were inextricably
intertwined with the statutory questions.
The employees of the company, then known as American
Telephone and Telegraph, selected the Communications Workers of
America (CWA) as an exclusive bargaining representative, under
section 9 of the NLRA.1 04 Although all employees were represented
by the union and paid fees to the union, not all were union members;
members paid dues, while nonmembers paid "agency fees" equal to
the dues.'s Twenty nonmember employees brought suit in order to
challenge the use of their fees for activities other than those related to
collective bargaining, such as lobbying, organizing the employees of
other employers, as well as social, political, and charitable
functions. 10 6 The suit was brought charging a violation of the CWA's
duty of fair representation, the statutory section of the NLRA allowing
the collection of fees (section 8(a)(3)), the First Amendment right of
association, and common-law fiduciary duties.107
The district court initially decided the case on constitutional
grounds, holding that the union was violating the nonmembers' First
Amendment right to association and ordering the reimbursement of
fees not spent on representational activities. 0 8 The district court
applied a clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard. 109
A panel of the Fourth Circuit agreed with the constitutional
analysis but shied away from the district court's reasoning, preferring
to rest its decision instead on a violation of the duty of fair
representation in section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 110 The court of appeals
rejected the clear-and-convincing standard, but found that several of

National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 452
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006)).
Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 739 (1988).
Id. at 739.
Id. at 739-40.
Id. at 740.
Beck v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 468 F. Supp. 93, 97 (D. Md. 1979).
109. Beck, 487 U.S. at 740.
110. Beck v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 776 F.2d 1187, 1205-06 (4th Cir.

103.
(codified
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

1985).
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the expenditures were indisputably unrelated to representation and
remanded the rest for the district court's determination under the
proper standard." IA dissent by Chief Judge Winter found the NLRA
did not address how the money was to be spent, and the portion of the
contract allowing the exaction of fees was private conduct which
could not violate a constitutional right." 2
Upon rehearing, the en banc Fourth Circuit reached a similar
conclusion.1 13 A majority (6-4) found jurisdiction over only the dutyof-fair-representation claim, and rendered judgment for the
nonmember employees on that basis.1 14 Only five of the membersnot including Judge Murnaghan, the deciding vote-would also have
rendered judgment based on section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA."' All six
members of the en banc majority, like the panel majority, rejected the
standard of review, affirmed some of the district court's findings and
remanded the rest. 116 Once more, Chief Judge Winter, along with
three others, dissented."'
The Supreme Court quickly answered the jurisdictional question
that split the en banc Fourth Circuit. The statutory claim under section
8(a)(3) of the NLRA was subject to the primary jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), but the constitutional and
duty-of-fair-representation claims were amenable to decision by the
federal courts.118 In order to decide the duty-of-fair-representation
claim, however, the Court needed to address the proper interpretation
of section 8(a)(3).1 19 Thus, Beck was not merely a statutory
111. Id. at 1209-13.
112. Id. at 1214 (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
113. Beck v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 800 F.2d 1280, 1282 (4th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam).
114. Id. at 1282.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1289-90 (Murnaghan, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 1290-93 (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
118. Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 742-44 (1988).
119. Id. at 743-44. To an extent, this is a product of litigation choices.
Ordinarily, employees "may not circumvent the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB
simply by casting statutory claims as violations of the union's duty of fair
representation." Id. at 743. But the employees here invoked only fair-representation
claims; the unions introduced the statute into the litigation by claiming that their
actions were permitted by statute. Id. at 743-44.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol47/iss1/2

18

Mallory: Still Other People's Money: Reconciling Citizens United with Aboo

2010]

STILL OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY

19

interpretation case but also one delineating the judicially-created duty
of fair representation.
The Court addressed the substantive questions in a little more
depth, framing them as matters of statutory interpretation. 120
Reasoning that the language in section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA was
drafted with explicit reference to section 2, Eleventh, of the Railway
Labor Act (RLA),121 the Court held the similar language in both acts
required a similar result regarding fees expended for non-organizing
purposes. 122 The Court adopted Justice Brennan's statutory analysis of
section 2, Eleventh from Street, reasoning there was no good reason to
interpret section 8(a)(3) any differently. 123 Explicit statements in the
legislative history persuaded the Court that the two statutes should be
interpreted in tandem.124 Senator Taft made clear his concern that
unions should not be able to use mandatory dues to finance political
speech with which the paying members might disagree.12 5 Taft even
went so far as to say that the prohibition on union political expenditure
was "exactly the same as the prohibition against a corporation using
its stockholders' money for political purposes."1 26 The key concern
behind congressional action was a free rider problem: after Congress
abolished closed union shops, non-union workers could benefit from
the union's bargaining without paying any dues. 127 The Court later
acknowledged the "twin purposes" of the legislative balance struck in
the NLRA:
On the one hand, the most serious abuses of compulsory unionism
were eliminated by abolishing the closed shop. On the other hand,
Congress recognized that in the absence of a union-security
provision "many employees sharing the benefits of what unions are
able to accomplish by collective bargaining will refuse to pay their
120. Id. at 745.
121. Railway Labor Act (RLA), ch. 1220, 64 Stat. 1238 (1951) (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (2006)).
122. Beck, 487 U.S. at 746-47.
123. See id. at 751-54.
124. Id. at 745-54.
125. 93 CONG. REc. 6440 (1947) (statement of Sen. Robert Taft).
126. Id. See also Winkler, supra note 34, at 928-29 (describing the floor
debate surrounding the NLRA).
127. Beck, 487 U.S. at 748 & n.5.
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share of the cost."1 28
Given how clearly the legislative history displayed the intent of
Congress, the Court reasoned that Street would effectively require the
same result.
The Beck Court declined to address whether constitutional
limitations should apply to union expenditures of fees, even though it
did in Street and Abood.129 The unions argued that the primary
motivation for the interpretation of the RLA in Street was
constitutional avoidance, and no such need presented itself in Beck,
therefore permitting a different interpretation of the NLRA.13 0 The
Court declined the invitation, stating the interpretation in Street was
adopted on its own terms, not solely for the purposes of avoiding a
constitutional question. 13 ' The Court therefore declined to decide
whether there was state action in Beck sufficient to create a
constitutional issue. 132
Beck and Abood together articulate a sense of corruption based on
the use of money that essentially belongs to other people for political
speech. 133 This core premise was elaborated and confirmed repeatedly
in later interpretations and associated areas of law.
C. Later Interpretations:Keller and Lehnert
Despite Beck's avoidance of the possible constitutional
implications of its ruling, later interpretations drew on Beck's
reasoning, combined with Street and Abood, to articulate a right based
128. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740-41 (1963) (quoting S.
REP. No. 80-105, at 6 (1947)).
129. Beck, 487 U.S. at 761-62.
130. Id. at 761.
131. Id. at 762.
132. Id. at 761.
133. See Winkler, supra note 5, at 204 (discussing Abood). Winkler also notes
that Justice Kennedy-a dissenter in Austin and the author of Citizens Unitedfound the union-dues cases applicable enough to warrant distinction. Id. at 205 &
nn.304-05 (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 709-10
(1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). The key distinction he discusses-the possibility
of exit for both shareholders and union members-will be discussed infra at Part B,
but for the time being it is very informative to note that the author of Citizens United
has acknowledged the applicability of the union-dues cases.
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on the duty of fair representation and the First Amendment right to be
free from compelled association with speech.
In 1990, the Court elided the distinction between public and
private employees in relation to the use of union contributions for
political advocacy, overriding the concerns Justice Powell expressed
in Abood. In Keller v. State Bar of California,134 the Court faced the
question whether mandatory state bar membership dues could be used
for political advocacy.' 35 The Court had earlier ruled a state could
require membership in a state bar,136 but had declined to rule on the
free speech challenge presented.137 When that challenge was taken up
in Keller, the Court applied the analysis of Abood, explicitly extending
it to the context of private-sector employment.138 Indeed, Keller went
on to apply Abood even as it rejected the argument that the state bar
should be considered a public actor. 139 After Keller, the constitutional
protections of Abood extended beyond public employees to employees
in the private sector. Also, Keller was decided on the basis of Abood
without reference to the RLA, the NLRA, or another federal statute.
In 1991, the Court outlined the First Amendment implications of
Hanson and Street in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association.140 in
Lehnert, the Court faced another challenge to the expenditures of a
union representing faculty members at a public college as part of a

union shop.141
Because the Court expressly has interpreted the RLA to avoid
serious doubt of [the statute's] constitutionality, the RLA cases
necessarily provide some guidance regarding what the First
Amendment will countenance in the realm of union support of

134. 496 U.S. 1 (1990). Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for a unanimous
Court. Id. at 4.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 7-8 (citing Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961)).
137. Id. at 9.
138. Id. at 10 ("[T]he principles of Abood apply equally to employees in the
private sector."). The Court discussed and distinguished Hanson. Id. at 7-9.
139. See id. at 12-14.
140. 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
141. Id. at 511-13.
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political activities through mandatory assessments. 142
The Court read Street, along with Ellis, to establish "expenses that are
relevant or 'germane' to the collective-bargaining functions of the
union generally will be constitutionally chargeable to dissenting
employees."l 43 However, "at least in the private sector, those
functions do not include political or ideological activities."14
Working through negative implication-expenditures for collectivebargaining functions are constitutional, and political activities are not
collective-bargaining functions-Lehnert read Street for the strong
implication that expenditures for political activities are
unconstitutional.145 A plurality of the Lehnert Court further discussed
the public nature of the employees' interest at stake. "[U]nlike
collective-bargaining negotiations between union and management,
our national and state legislatures, the media, and the platform of
public discourse are public fora open to all."l 4 6 The burden placed on
the employees' interest was not justified by the state's interest in
"harmonious industrial relations." 14 7 Moreover, a plurality of the
Court found:
The burden upon freedom of expression is particularly great where,
as here, the compelled speech is in a public context. By utilizing
[the employees'] funds for political lobbying and to garner the
support of the public in its endeavors, the union would use each
dissenter as "an instrument for fostering public adherence to an

142. Id. at 516 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. Despite this reading, the conclusion does not necessarily follow.
Political activities are not among one category of constitutional activities, but that
does not exclude the possibility that they may fall within another.
146. Id. at 521 (plurality opinion). This dictum presents the strong proposition
that purchased political speech effectively operates as a form of traditional public
forum. If this is so, then the applicability and force of the union-dues cases become
even more important to understand post-Citizens United.
147. Id. ("Because worker and union cannot be said to speak with one voice, it
would not further the cause of harmonious industrial relations to compel objecting
employees to finance union political activities as well as their own.").
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ideological point of view he finds unacceptable." 1 48
The possibility of compelled public speech overrode the state's
interests involved in the labor context, and the plurality opinion gave
no reason that would limit the principle only to that context.
Taken together, the trajectory of cases from Hanson and Street,
through Abood and Beck, to Keller and Lehnert, establishes a robust
source of law to support the "other people's money" conception of
corruption that Winkler found in Austin. Those cases also showcased a
different divided conception of the corporate speaker at work,
contrasting with the singular speaker of Bellotti.
D. SegregatedFunds and Legislative Judgment
To elaborate his argument regarding the union-dues cases,
Winkler also discusses a set of cases that arose in parallel regarding
segregated funds (PACs)149 : United States v. CIO,'s0 United States v.
UAW-CIO,"'5 and PipefittersLocal Union No. 562 v. United States.15 2
Significantly, these cases mark the Supreme Court's first forays into
campaign finance law' 53 and a crucial point where "the Court grabbed
hold of the principal/agent argument used by Congress to justify the
[contribution] bans on both unions and corporations and effectively
inserted it into First Amendment free speech doctrine." 154 In a
nutshell, the Court extrapolated from the legislative judgments behind
the Tillman and Taft-Hartley Acts to find that preventing otherpeople's-money corruption was a significant enough state interest to
warrant restrictions on contributions and expenditures from general
funds, but otherwise upheld corporate political speech when these
"agency costs" could be avoided. 155
The circumstances surrounding the enactment of the Tillman Act
are well documented and show Congress's core concern for the use of
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 522 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977)).
Winkler, supra note 34, at 930-33.
335 U.S. 106 (1948).
352 U.S. 567 (1957).
407 U.S. 385 (1972).
Winkler, supra note 34, at 930.
Id.
Id. at 930-31.
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"other people's money." One of the initial seeds was planted in the
course of a famous bacchanal known to history as the Hyde Ball.
When word reached newspapers at the beginning of 1905 that James
Hazen Hyde-vice president of Equitable Life, son of its founder, and
"spectacular dilettante"' 56 -"had thrown an opulent ball and charged
the expenses to the company,"1 57 popular furor erupted. 5 1 The New
York State Legislature responded by convening what would later be
known as the Armstrong Committee, which investigated the
allegations of mismanagement and corruption in fifteen different
insurance companies between September and December of 1905.159
The revelations of widespread use of policyholder money-equivalent
to shareholder money for insurance companies-resulted in thorough
reform of insurance regulation in New York. 160 Beyond insurance
reform, however, the Armstrong Committee's findings also led to
crucial reforms of corporate campaign spending, especially of other
people's money. What "most shocked the public" was "the use of
policy-holders' money in corrupting legislatures."161 When George W.
Perkins, the vice president of New York Life, testified before the
Armstrong Committee that he had given $48,000 to President
156.

MARK SULLIVAN, OUR TIMES: THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1925, PRE-

WAR AMERICA 34 (1930).

157. Winkler, supra note 34, at 888. Although the costume ball did happen,
the accusation that Hyde charged the expenses to the company turned out to be false,
initiated by the board of directors. PATRICIA BEARD, AFTER THE BALL: GILDED AGE
SECRETS, BOARDROOM BETRAYALS, AND THE PARTY THAT IGNITED THE GREAT

WALL STREET SCANDAL OF 1905, at 178 (2004) ("For an entire century, the party
continued to mutate."). Nevertheless, the investigations that followed revealed
sufficiently outrageous malfeasance that the falsity of the accusations regarding the
party fell by the wayside. Id. at 183-200; see also id. at 208 (political cartoon
depicting Hyde as a plucked peacock whose feathers were stuffed into the pockets of
"Wall Street and political 'fat cats"'). The link between the Equitable Life battle and
Wall Street-all of which came to light only because of anger over the famous
ball-prompted attention from as high up as President Roosevelt. Id. at 210-29.
158. Winkler, supra note 34, at 887-88.
159. Id. at 888. The investigation was led by Charles Evans Hughes, who later
became a Supreme Court Justice. Id. at 889-90. The Armstrong Committee also
influenced Louis Brandeis's Other People's Money article in 1914. See BRANDEIS,
supra note 1, at 16. In a sense, the Hyde Ball put two Justices on the Court.
160. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 890 & n.128.
161. Burton J. Hendrick, Governor Hughes, MCCLURE'S MAG., Mar. 1908, at
521, 534.
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Roosevelt's campaign fund, "the newspaper men ran for the nearest
telephones."l 62
The Armstrong Committee's Final Report brought anger at the
use of "other people's money" to the foreground, which in turn ignited
robust federal action. The report laid out the argument in no uncertain
terms: "Neither executive officers nor directors should be allowed to
use the moneys paid for the purpose of insurance in support of
political candidates or platforms."' 63 The outrage was directed
specifically at the fact that the use of the money effectively
contradicted the views of at least some policyholders: "executive
officers have sought to impose their political views upon a
constituency of divergent convictions . . . ."16 President Roosevelt-

perhaps spurred into action by the revelation that he had received
corporate contributions after he claimed not to have-used his State of
the Union Address to propose a complete ban on corporate
contributions. 165 Congress accepted the President's invitation and
passed an outright ban-the Tillman Act.' 66 Justice Stevens's dissent
in Citizens United recognized the central role of anger over misuse of
"other people's money" in Congress's enactment of the Tillman
Act. 16 7 The final bill's prohibition was unequivocal: "It shall ... be
unlawful for any corporation whatever to make a money contribution

162. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES
EVANS HUGHES 125-26 (David J. Danielski & Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 1973). See
also Winkler, supra note 34, at 891-92.
163.

J. COMM. OF THE S. AND ASSEMB. OF THE STATE OF N.Y. APPOINTED TO

INVESTIGATE THE AFFAIRS OF LIFE INS. Cos., REPORT, Assemb. Doc. No. 41, at 393

(1906).
164. Id.
165. 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905) (Annual Message of President Theodore
Roosevelt) ("[D]irectors should not be permitted to use stockholders' money for
such purposes."). See also Winkler, supra note 34, at 920.
166. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907). See also Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152-53 (2003) (summarizing the origins of the
ban on corporate contributions); id. at 149 (extending the prohibition to nonprofit
advocacy corporations).
167. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 977-78 (2010)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting Beaumont endorsed the congressional judgment that
the use of other people's money was a source of corruption permitting abridgement
of corporate speech).
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in connection with any election" involving federal candidates. 68 After
a flood of union money helped to elect a different President Roosevelt
in 1936, the ban was extended to include unions in the Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947.169 The ban on union contributions was explicitly
intended to be "exactly the same as the prohibition against a
corporation using its stockholders' money for political purposes, and
perhaps in violation of the wishes of many of its stockholders."17 0 The
congressional intentions behind the prohibitions on corporate and
union contributions were unmistakable, even though they were
enacted four decades apart; Congress clearly desired to prohibit the
use of other people's money for political speech with which they
might disagree.
The concerns motivating the Tillman and Taft-Hartley Acts
formed the background for the evolution of a fixture of modem
politics-the political action committee (PAC) or segregated fundthrough a series of Supreme Court cases. The Court in United States v.
CIO permitted unions to endorse candidates in in-house publications
paid for with union dues. 17 1 Because only members of the union
received the endorsement, the support was considered effectively
voluntary-agency costs were basically zeroed out. 172 When a union
purchased a television ad, the factual backdrop for United States v.

168. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864-65 (1907). Because the Act predated
the Seventeenth Amendment, it extended to contribution to the state legislators who
elected U.S. senators. Winkler, supra note 34, at 925.
169. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61
Stat. 136 (1947). The ban was first imposed as a temporary measure, War Labor
Disputes Act, Pub. L. No. 78-89, 57 Stat. 163 (1943), but was made permanent after
the end of World War II. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 928. The motivations of this
extension seem to be more mixed than the clear populist rage that motivated the
Tillman Act. At least in part, Congress was motivated by Cecil B. DeMille's refusal
to pay a $1.00 special assessment to the American Federation of Radio Artists. Id. at
929 & n.396. See also DeMille v. Am. Fed'n of Radio Artists, 187 P.2d 769, 772
(Cal. 1947).
170. 93 CONG. REC. 6440 (1947) (statement of Sen. Robert Taft).
171. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 123-24 (1948).
172. Id. at 123 ("It is unduly stretching language to say that the members or
stockholders are unwilling participants in such normal organizational activities....");
Winkler, supra note 34, at 930-31. Notably, the CIO Court considered union
members and corporate stockholders in the same breath.
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UAW-CIO,1 73 the publication could no longer be considered in-house.
The district court1 7 4 found the expenditure fell outside the statutory
prohibition because it was what we would now term an "independent
expenditure" rather than a contribution to a candidate.' 7 5 The Court
reversed the dismissal of the charge and remanded, insisting on further
fact-finding, including questions going to the voluntary nature vel non
of the payments from which the broadcasts were financed. 176 After
UAW-CIO and the insistence on the voluntary nature of the incoming
money, unions began to use PACs more extensively, guaranteeing that
the money spent for political advocacy would be voluntarily
acquired.' 7 7 When the Nixon administration attempted to curtail this
use of segregated funds for political contributions in Pipefitters Local
Union No. 562 v. United States,17 8 the Court specifically questioned
the voluntary nature of the contributions: were the unions using other
people's money, or money given for the intended purpose? 179 To the
extent the union could show the contributions were voluntary, the use
of those funds for political speech was considered constitutionally
protected.180 The Court's chief concern for agency costs-whether the
funds used for political speech were voluntarily given for that
purpose-motivated the evolution of election law on segregated
funds, providing an independent source of law. Along with Beck and
Abood, the segregated-fund cases reiterate and strengthen the
congressional concern
for other-people's-money
corruption

173. 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957).
174. UAW-CIO was heard on direct appeal from the district court, id. at 568,
so there was no opinion from a court of appeals.
175. Id. at 585, 589.
176. Id. at 592-93. Interestingly, it is the UAW-CIO dissent that proposed
union members be allowed to withdraw their funds from this sort of use. See id. at
596-97 & n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (attributing such a scheme to longstanding
English law).
177. Winkler, supra note 34, at 932 & n.413 (collecting sources).
178. 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
179. Id. at 414 ("We hold, too, that, although solicitation by union officials is
permissible, such solicitation must be conducted under circumstances plainly
indicating that donations are for a political purpose and that those solicited may
decline to contribute without loss of job, union membership, or any other reprisal
within the union's institutional power.").
180. Winkler, supra note 34, at 932.
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showcased in the Tillman and Taft-Hartley Acts.
Street raised the possibility that the RLA might pose a risk of
compelled political speech if unions were permitted to use dues raised
by union shops and (perhaps presciently) avoided the constitutional
matter by interpreting the RLA to preclude the troublesome
expenditures. Beck extended the statutory analysis to the NLRA, but
the National Labor Relations Board then read Beck into the judiciallycreated right of fair representation.' 8 ' Abood examined the
constitutional question in the context of public employees. Keller
confirmed that the constitutional ramifications were the same in the
context of private-sector employment, and also that the same
principles could apply without a federal statute in the background. By
the time Lehnert was decided, the Court seemed to be quite
comfortable with the proposition that the expenditure of union fees on
political advocacy was unconstitutionally corrupt. The union-dues
cases could stand alongside the segregated-fund cases to support the
principles in Austin and MCFL.
III. THE CHOICE BEFORE THE COURT: CITIZENS UNITED AND BELLOTTI
VERSUS AusTIN, ABOOD, AND THE TILLMAN ACT

Whatever else may be uncertain about Citizens United, Austin's
fate was decisive: "Austin ... should be and now is overruled."l 8 2 The
holding in Citizens United was the crowning articulation of a principle
the Supreme Court had been refining for decades: corporations not
only speak, but have a right to free speech parallel to the right to free
speech held by individuals. Moreover, Citizens United only
recognized quid pro quo corruption as deserving the state's
attention.1 83 The decision marked a watershed turning point, even

181. See Prod. Workers Union of Chi. v. NLRB, 161 F.3d 1047, 1053 (7th Cir.
1998). The NLRB found that unions were required by the duty of fair representation
to notify union workers of their rights under Beck. See California Saw & Knife
Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224 (1995), enforced sub nom. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom.
Strang v. NLRB, 525 U.S. 813 (1998). The NLRB denominated this as a "fiduciary
duty." CaliforniaSaw, 320 N.L.R.B. at 232-33.
182. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
183. Id. at 903 (describing Austin's rationale solely in terms of equalizing
voice and explaining the alternative as quid pro quo corruption).
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though it was characterized as a relatively small step.' 84 The rationale
and scope of Citizens United is an uncomfortable fit with the Court's
other free speech precedents, including the union-speech cases.
The Citizens United majority drew primarily on an individualistic
rationale for corporate political speech, eschewing possible
justification as a form of expressive association.' 8 ' This approach
stands in contrast to the union-speech cases, which emphasized the
non-unitary nature of the speaker-namely the possibility of
disagreement between the union and the dues-payer, which featured
prominently in Abood, Beck, and Keller. Such an approach
emphasizes the agency costs involved with the union's political
speech. Indeed, Winkler noted that concern for agency costs
motivated both Congress and the courts in formulating the doctrines
governing union political speech. 186 Bellotti at least gave a short
discussion of agency costs, while Citizens United gave none at all.187
In the corporate field, a concern for the use of "other people's money"
had all but evaporated, resulting in a strongly individualistic focus on
the corporate speaker, rather than on possible externalities.
184. See id. at 911-13. Such a characterization falls in line with David
Strauss's theory of common-law constitutional adjudication, where small steps
eventually make a major shift inevitable, even though the final step is not all that
large. David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
REv. 877, 935 (1996). Arguably, the most radical step Citizens United took was
overruling Austin, but the Court did so only after protesting that it had been
undermined for decades. Id. at 911-13.
185. See generally id. at 896-911. See also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 631-38 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (distinguishing between associations
primarily oriented toward expression and associations that serve a primarily
transactional purpose). In Roberts, Justice O'Connor recognized the different free
speech interests that associations might manifest as well as the fact that the interests
did not fall neatly into two clearly distinct categories. Id. at 636. However, Justice
O'Connor focused only on the association's free speech rights, and not how the
rights interacted with the right of the association's members not to associate with
that speech. Id.
186. Winkler, supra note 34, at 929-30. See supra Part II.D.
187. See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792-95 (1978)
(discussing and rejecting a concern for protecting the shareholders from "the use of
corporate resources in furtherance of views with which some shareholders may
disagree"). As discussed infra, the Court rejected the statute but not necessarily the
principle behind it. Citizens United gave a cursory discussion that mainly rehashed
ideas the Court had rejected in the past. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
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Citizens United addressed unions and corporations on the same
footing. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)
prohibited direct contributions and independent expenditures from the
general funds of both corporations and unions.' 88 However, an indirect
contribution from "a separate segregated fund (known as a political
action committee, or PAC)" funded by voluntary contributions was
permissible. 189 The trajectory of the Buckley/Bellotti line of cases
found dispositive in Citizens United lay through the segregated-funds
cases. 190 The holding in Citizens United invalidated the very provision
that restrained corporations and unions on equal footing.1 91 Indeed,
courts had been treating corporations and unions equivalently for
decades.' 92 The majority opinion in Citizens United gestured toward
treating corporations and unions differently,1 93 but recognized that
"the Court [did not] adopt the proposition." 94 Citizens United
presented no principled reason to exclude unions from its holding and,
indeed, addressed unions and corporations on exactly the same
footing.
Citizens United does address, however, the shareholder protection
rationale that inheres in Austin, MCFL, and the union dues cases.195
The majority opinion raises two well-trodden arguments: media
188. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887 (citing Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (BCRA), 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)).
189. Id. at 887 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)).
190. Id. at 900-01 (discussing CIO, UAW-CIO, and Pipefitters). See also
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788-92 (describing the anti-corruption rationale presented in
CIO and UAW-CIO).
191. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 ("Section 441b's restrictions on
corporate independent expenditures are therefore invalid .....
192. Winkler, supra note 34, at 931 & nn.408-09.
193. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 911. Bellotti also rejected a shareholder protection justification for
restrictions on corporate contributions. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792-95; see also
Winkler, supra note 34, at 879. However, the reasoning was fully grounded in
criticism of the Massachusetts statute at stake in that case and did not address any
constitutional concerns. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 793 (calling the statute "both
underinclusive and overinclusive"). The Court concluded that the awkward fit of the
statute demonstrated a weak interest, as well as a lack of "substantially relevant
correlation between the governmental interest asserted" and the statutory
restrictions. Id. at 795 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960)).
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corporations pose a difficulty, and shareholders can use "the
procedures of corporate democracy."' 96 Because media corporations
are inherently expressive, the majority argued, a government interest
in protecting dissenting shareholders would always justify regularly
abridging the speech of media corporations.' 97 But even Austin
recognized that media corporations were a special case where the
government's interest had to give way to broader First Amendment
interests.198 Moreover, seen from the perspective of preventing otherpeople's-money corruption, the agency costs involved with media
corporations are much lower than other corporations. 199 For example,
a shareholder in News Corporation (the parent of Fox News) or GE
(the parent of NBC and MSNBC) is more likely cognizant that his or
her money will go toward a specific form of political expression (in
the form of arguably ideologically-slanted news) than a shareholder of
Target. Thus, when Target became one of the first companies to test
out the limits of Citizens United by contributing $150,000 to a group
producing advertising in support of Minnesota Republican
gubernatorial candidate Tom Emmer, the resulting furor forced a
contrite apology from the corporation, which still faces widespread
boycotts. 200 Shareholders expect media corporations to voice opinions
as part of the business they do, but do not expect the same from retail
chains, resulting in much higher agency costs in the latter case. A
theory of corruption concerned with the agency costs of using "other
people's money" for speech with which they disagree or do not
consent would therefore be much more concerned with non-media
corporations. The criticism advanced by the majority in Citizens
United fails to reckon with the proper breadth of Austin's theory of
196. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794).
197. Id.
198. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666-68 (1990).
199. See Winkler, supra note 5, at 161.
200. Brody Mullins & Ann Zimmerman, Target Discovers Downside to
Political Contributions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2010, at A2; Target Corp. Defends
Political Giving, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2010, at AA2. A leader of OutFront
Minnesota, a gay-rights group, stated, "A lot of people feel betrayed." Target Corp.
Defends Political Giving, supra. This sense of betrayal is one of the warning flags of
other-people's-money corruption, although, in this case, the sentiment was voiced
by a stakeholder rather than a shareholder. Target has not as yet withdrawn the
donation. Mullins & Zimmerman, supra.
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corruption, and therefore swings wide of the mark.
The Citizens United majority's second criticism is the same
formulation found in dissent in the union-dues cases: the ordinary
forms of corporate governance, including the right of exit, adequately
protect a dissenting shareholder's right not to be associated with the
objectionable political speech. 20 1 Despite treating unions and
corporations as substantially interchangeable in Citizens United,
Justice Kennedy's dissent in Austin emphasized the difference
between the two by arguing that a shareholder may more easily sell
his or her shares than a union member can abandon his or her
membership and job.2 02 These differences, however, are thinner than
they might seem. Union members, just like shareholders, can form
rival groups and seek change from within. Conversely, shareholders
may also face difficulties in alienating their interests in corporations or
may not even be aware of what speech their money finances.
Logistically, if a shareholder owns title through an intermediary, such
as a pension fund or mutual fund, they may have no control over the
alienation and acquisition of their stock at all.20 3 Finally, a shareholder
can only react in this manner after his or her money has financed the
objectionable speech, which greatly reduces the effectiveness of the
remedy. It is tit-for-tat retaliation, because the speech has already
taken place. 204 In order for these remedies to be robust enough to
protect the rights of dissenting shareholders to avoid compelled
speech, they must be taken more seriously than Justice Kennedy took
them in Citizens United or his Austin dissent.
By placing unions and corporations on equal footing, Citizens
United left open the door for applying the union-speech precedents
outside the union context, to the generalized corporate political speech
that Citizens United recognized and enabled for the first time.
Recognized as early as Senator Taft's speech on the floor, the two
contexts are sufficiently parallel that no principled distinction exists
that would prevent the cross-application of the precedents. The chief

201. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911, 916.
202. Austin, 494 U.S. at 709-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (suggesting instead
that dissenters can "seek change from within, withhold financial support, cease to
associate with the group, or form a rival group of their own").
203. Winkler, supra note 5, at 205-06.
204. Id.
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distinction is that the government has a well-defined interest in the
union context that does not necessarily carry over into another
context. The other elements of a First Amendment analysis,
however-the applicability of the Constitution, the nature of the rights
involved, and the relevant analysis--do not differ as a consequence of
the different contexts.
The union's duty of fair representation runs parallel to the
corporation's fiduciary duty to its shareholders. Both are judge-made
duties that require the association to hold a special regard for the wellbeing of its members in particular ways. Beck assimilated the statutory
duty articulated in section 8(a)(3) of the RLA to the duty of fair
representation, and the NLRB ratified this interpretation in California
Saw. 20 5 The judge-made duty of fair representation thus includes the
statutorily-grounded principles articulated in Beck.20 6
Indeed, in Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, the Court specifically
read Beck to find that the use of "other people's money" was the core
of the breach of the duty of fair representation. 207 It found that the
very reason the union's actions in Beck violated the duty of fair
representation, rather than merely pleading a statutory violation, was
that the union "used that money [from mandatory dues] for purposes
wholly unrelated to the grant of authority that gave it the right to
collect that money, and in ways that were antithetical to the interests
of some of the workers that it was required to serve." 20 8 The use of
other people's money turned a statutory violation into a breach of a
fiduciary duty of fair representation.
Applying these discussions of the ramifications of the duty of fair
representation to the parallel fiduciary duty, 209 the corporate right to

205. See California Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 232-33 (1995).
206. See Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 43 (1998)
(collecting cases linking the statutory right with the duty of fair representation). But
see id. at 45 (finding that a statutory violation standing alone was insufficient to
show a breach of the duty of fair representation). While the two are related, they are
not coterminous.
207. Id. at 45.
208. Id. (citing Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 743-44
(1988)).
209. See CaliforniaSaw, 320 N.L.R.B. at 232-33 (designating the duty of fair
representation as a form of fiduciary duty). For obvious reasons, this is an analogy
and not binding authority. However, the fact that an authoritative agency used a very
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political speech already faces some constraints not addressed by
Citizens United. Perhaps most importantly of all, hiding in plain sight,
is the fact that the Tillman Act has not yet been struck down:
corporations cannot make campaign contributions directly to
candidates. 2 10 The legislative judgments embodied in the Tillman Act
still prevail, embodying a fundamental congressional discomfort with
the idea that a corporation may spend "other people's money" on
political speech.
The question of state action does not provide an adequate reason
to distinguish the corporate and union contexts. In order for the First
Amendment to constrain a corporation's use of funds (for its own
protected political speech), some state action must be present to
invoke the Constitution. 2 11 One of the lessons of the union-speech
cases is that this state action may be fairly minimal in order to require
scrutiny. Keller reached the constitutional question without direct state
action, and set aside the public/private employer distinction as
irrelevant. 212 Beck itself confirmed that a government agency was not
a prerequisite to suit.2 13 The later refinements of Abood's application
of First Amendment principles demonstrate that those principles
extend far beyond the facts of that case.
Lehnert provides another possible source of traction for
constitutional analysis: it suggests the existence of a public forum. 2 14
If corporate political speech takes place by leave of the federal
government, the requirement of state action could be met. 2 15 The
loaded phrase is indicative of how similarly the duties operate.
This parallel becomes important in relation to the business judgment rule.
One might object to the thesis of this Article by noting that corporations may spend
their money according to their sound business judgment without direct meddling by
the shareholders. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). The
chief boundary placed around the business judgment rule, however, is the
corporation's fiduciary duty to act in its shareholders' best interests. See id. at 893.
210. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
211. See, e.g., Ry. Emps. Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1956) ("A
union agreement made pursuant to the Railway Labor Act has, therefore, the
imprimatur of federal law on it.").
212. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 9, 12-13 (1990); Ellis v. Bhd. of
Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455-57 (1984).
213. See Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1988).
214. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 521 (1991).
215. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801-
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pervasive federal system creating and regulating political
campaigns-and therefore opportunities for political contributions and
expenditures-is like the pervasive federal regulation of
labor/management relations that provided the backdrop for Street and
Beck. This federalization of the field was sufficient to provoke
constitutional concerns even though the federal law was permissive in
nature, permitting but not requiring union shops and the expenditure
of dues for political advocacy. 2 16 Furthermore, the enforcement of the
system through the courts ratified the state action. 2 17 Likewise, the
creation and enforcement of federal campaign regulations, such as
BCRA, enforced by courts up to and including the creation or
affirmation of rights (Buckley, Citizens United), sufficiently involves
the state so that all expenditures are made with the indirect imprimatur
of the government. Such an imprimatur is enough to raise First
Amendment concerns.
By overruling Austin, Citizens United would seem to have
rejected the possibility of other-people's-money corruption serving as
a state interest for constraining corporate political speech. But its
rejection is hardly thoroughgoing: Citizens United failed to overrule
either the union-dues line of cases or the segregated-fund cases, both
of which articulate a theory of corruption and conception of corporate
speech that stands in stark contrast to that embodied by the
BellottilCitizens United line of cases. The Court will eventually have
to deal with the business left unfinished in Citizens United.
The Court might simply let the conflict stand, leaving unions in a
regime where they must refund money to dissenting members but
corporations with fewer fetters. Doing so would introduce a
distinction between union and corporate speech, which the Court has
consistently rejected.2 18 Unaltered, this regime seems unsustainable.
Alternatively, the Court could finish the work of Citizens United
06 (1985) (finding a medium of communication created and used by leave of the
government to be a nonpublic forum for the purposes of forum analysis).
216. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 232.
217. Id. at 232 n.4.
218. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 931 & nn.408-09. As noted previously,
Justice Kennedy seems more comfortable with this sort of distinction. See Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010). Given that he is also
cognizant that "the Court [did not] adopt the proposition," id., Citizens United serves
to reopen an issue that the Court had deemed closed for decades.
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by finding that it overruled sub silentio both the union-dues and
segregated-funds cases, giving unions the same unfettered right to free
speech that corporations have. Such an action would draw into serious
question the constitutionality of both the Tillman and Taft-Hartley
Acts and virtually require their invalidation as a matter of logic. While
this eventuality is not impossible, it would work a thoroughgoing and
radical change on campaign finance regulation, setting the Court at
war with over a century of Congress's legislative judgments. The
Court is loath to take such drastic action sub silentio, preferring to
wait for a case where the issue is squarely presented.
Beck provides another possibility that preserves both the right of
the corporation to speak and the right of the shareholder to avoid
compelled speech: opt-out. Beck did not foreclose political speech by
unions; it merely required that it be funded by voluntary
contributions. 2 19 The same theme was echoed in the segregated funds
cases. 22 0 If the agency costs can be reduced by ensuring the money
spent on political speech was acquired for that purpose, then the rights
of both the corporation and the shareholder are vindicated. Winkler's
theory of agency costs provides a clear and consistent way to
reconcile the conflicting lines of authority lying behind
Bellotti/Citizens United and Beck/AboodlAustin. Given the
alternatives, this solution may represent the most parsimonious and
least invasive way to finish what Citizens United started.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
Reducing the agency costs of corporate political speech presents a
policy problem. The Court repeatedly split in the union-speech cases
over how to remedy the wrong done, usually ending up with a middleroad refund remedy that satisfied fewer Justices as time wore on.
Street and Beck remedied the infringement with a rebate scheme,
which required the dissenting union member to step forward, profess
219. See Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745, 762-63
(1988).
220. See supra Part H.D; Winkler, supra note 34, at 930-33; see also United
States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 596 n.1 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The
protection of union members from the use of their funds in supporting a cause with
which they do not sympathize may be cured by permitting the minority to withdraw
their funds from that activity.").
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what expenditures she objected to, and claim a pro rata share of the
funds used for the advocacy.2 2 1 Such a regime was implemented by
the NLRB following Beck. 222 Such a union-member-initiated system
faced criticism because it was difficult to administer, and because it
placed the burden on the individual to vindicate his or her own First
Amendment rights (rather than on the state to justify the
infringement). Nevertheless, it balanced the rights of both the union
and member.
In the shareholder context, similar arguments apply, although the
force of the objections to shareholder-initiated dissent is weaker.
Shareholders could be required to claim a rebate based on professed
disagreement with the political expenditures of the corporation. While
a union member might legitimately fear coercion or reprisal for openly
disagreeing, 223 that possibility is considerably diminished in the
corporate context: a corporation can do much less individualized harm
to a single shareholder than a union could do to a single member.
Thus, the criticisms of such a rebate scheme that might apply in a
union context are even less persuasive in a corporate context.
Alternatively, a rebate could be initiated by the corporation in an
overly-inclusive manner. A corporation could simply rebate an
amount equivalent to its political-advocacy budget to all shareholders
in the form of a dividend. Such a broad rebate would return money to
dissenting shareholders pro rata, but would also return it to those who
were in agreement with the corporation's speech. While this solution
would satisfy the shareholder First Amendment concerns, it would be
over-inclusive. If compelled by the state, it would not be sufficiently
tailored to survive scrutiny on behalf of the corporation's First
Amendment rights. The corporation would be forced to return more
money than necessary, effectively paying a premium for its speech.
Rather than a rebate, a corporation could also allow for a preemptive opt-out by shareholders. While a corporation would not be
221. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 749-54 (expressing the balanced interested behind a
rebate scheme); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 775 (1961)
(mentioning a restitutional remedy).
222. See California Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224 (1995), enforced
sub nom. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1012
(7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Strang v. NLRB, 525 U.S. 813 (1998).
223. See Street, 367 U.S. at 765-67 (noting the difficulty of exit posed by
potential retaliation for dissenters who expressly bucked the union's leadership).
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able to predict all of its political spending ex ante, it could simply
allow shareholders the option of protecting their investment from all
use for political speech. Because this remedy acts before the spending
occurs, it would be more effective than an ex post solution such as exit
or internal agitation. An ex ante remedy would also not face the
problem of an over-inclusive rebate, because the ultimate choice to
exercise the option would lie in the hands of the shareholders. While it
might be optimal for corporations to give a menu of planned political
speech to shareholders and allow them to select which ones they
refuse to support, such a prediction would be infeasible given the
realities of political campaigns. Giving shareholders the option of
protecting their investment from being used for any political speech
respects their right not to be associated with disagreeable political
speech while permitting the corporation to spend money that it
possesses with the understanding that the funds will be used for
political speech. While not optimally tailored from the shareholder's
perspective (who might like a more finely-tuned instrument), this
solution does not infringe upon the corporation's right to spend the
money for political speech and still protects the shareholder's
investment.
V. CONCLUSION
From the moment certiorari was granted, Citizens United was
already recognized as a case that would have an impact far beyond its
facts.2 24 Citizens United overruled Austin, one of the keystone cases
articulating a particular vision of corruption and corporate speech that
had guided Congress's intent for nearly a century. However, Austin
was not the only case embodying that legislative judgment; a series of
cases in the union dues and segregated funds contexts also instantiated
the determination (both legislative and judicial) that the use of "other
people's money" for political speech was sufficiently prone to
224. SCOTUSBLOG, for example, noted that the initial argument of the case
could "potentially lead[] to a major alteration of constitutional law in this field."
Lyle Denniston, Preview: Movies as PoliticalMessages, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 22,
2009, 6:04 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=9025. By the time of the
reargument, Citizens United was being hailed as "a truly momentous case." Doug
Kendall, Five Reasons Why Citizens United is a Truly Momentous Case, ACSBLOG
(Sept. 1, 2009, 5:29 PM), http://www.acslaw.org/node/14030.
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corruption that the state had an interest in controlling it. Citizens
United drew on a line of cases focusing on quid pro quo corruption
and a unitary view of the corporate form, which stood in contrast to
Austin's principles. The Court now faces a decision about how to
handle the ramifications of Citizens United. The most parsimonious
solution would be to recognize that the principles articulated in the
union-dues and segregated-funds cases apply to the corporate context,
warranting a remedy such as a pre-emptive opt-out by shareholders.
While these principles are in tension with those articulated in Bellotti
and Citizens United, they are not mutually exclusive. The Court canand eventually must-find a way to protect corporations' right to
political speech without allowing them to spend "other people's
money" to finance it.
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